What does postmodernism believe

It thus derives from an anti-epistemological standpoint; anti-realism; opposition to transcendent arguments; rejection of truth theories; rejection of categorical analyses; a critique of reason itself as a positive guide for the life of humans. If Post-Modernism is represented in any positive manner it might might be characterized by gendered, historical, and ethno-centric definitions of truth, as well as an insistence on the social construction of world views.

However, the basic postmodernist movement is unfortunately but inextricably bound to factionalism and centrisms of all sorts and supportive of primitive tribal, clan , and ethnic groupings and validations for all beliefs..

In the Post Modern view there are no absolutes of any kind and there are no universal truths nor universal criteria for beauty and nor are there universal principles of the GOOD. Thus, there is a return of relativism in the sphere of morality. With that return there is also the threat of chaos which relativism spawns. As reaction to this trend there is an increase in the numbers of people returning to religion and religious principles as the foundation for their moral lives. The fastest growing religion in the world is Islam.

Islam is increasing in its population through a birth rate higher than average and through conversions. In consequence, although Popper frequently expressed dislike toward thinkers such as Foucault see, e. Consider the ideal of objective knowledge. It disregards or denigrates all hands not dealt in these terms e. Any views not based on scientific tenets—for example, those of sundry religions, political action groups, ethnicities, genders, cultures—can be dismissed as folk beliefs—or more pejoratively, as value-biased, superstitious, or despotic.

But is this the objective knowledge that Popper had in mind? Popper would probably agree that claims to objective knowledge are problematic and can indeed be easily abused to justify discrimination and other forms of power games. We will come back to this question in the paragraphs on the conceptualizations of progress and the role of empirical research methods.

I mean this in the sense that it is not regarded as outright impossible to reach some form of a common understanding and consensus among well-meaning participants in discourse. Of course, such a consensus is fallible, and it occurs against a certain socio-historical background. In constructivism, intersubjectivity is needed as well as means of reaching a consensual understanding of social constructions. Hence, attempts at mutual understanding are necessarily at the core of any postmodern research agenda.

Postmodernism sensu Gergen, in contrast, seems to merely aim at acknowledging and giving voice to different social constructions and world views; critical rationalism also endorses diversity, but attempts should be made at reaching some form of common sense whenever that is possible.

Here, postmodernists will most likely be afraid that in the attempt to find common ground and common sense privileged groups will be likely to normatively enforce their world views upon less privileged groups. To the critical rationalist, this is a valid concern, but giving up attempts at reaching a mutual understanding in the sense of consensually negated assessments of problems and proposed solutions would mean to give up any chance for societal or epistemological progress, and this is not an option for the critical rationalist.

Progress in the form of replacing theories with better theories is a central concept in critical rationalist thinking. Although to Popper all knowledge is preliminary, he would maintain that one can hardly deny that there has been some form of progress in science that mirrors the increasing complexity of life forms caused by at least at the level of individuals seemingly chaotic attempts at propagating genes see, e. Both in science and in biological evolution, evolutionary success depends on the creation and survival of objective knowledge, which in biology is called adaptation.

That is, the ability of a theory or gene to survive in a niche is not a haphazard function of its structure but depends on whether enough true and useful information about the niche is implicitly or explicitly encoded there Deutsch, , p. Of course, knowledge is not accumulated in a monotonous way, in the sense that true statements about the world are kept whereas wrong statements are dismissed for a criticism of this positivistic notion of a cumulative growth of knowledge see Kuhn, , p.

Totalitarian societal structures that prohibit asking critical questions and trying out new solutions for problems can even forestall any progress whatsoever for some time. However, according to Deutsch , p. Deutsch does not deny the existence of problems such as global warming and environmental pollution e.

The critical rationalist idea of progress critically relies on a certain degree of optimism, in the sense of belief that at least some of the problems we face can indeed be solved. What Gergen seems to dislike most about the Western grand narrative is that it silences other voices such as, for example, the voice of less privileged members of a society and the voice of non-Western societies altogether.

To some degree, critical rationalists would agree that no voice must be silenced as long as it does not itself demand the silencing of other voices in a totalitarian sense see Popper, However, Popper and Deutsch would certainly argue that there are rational, and to some degree objective, reasons to prefer of course, in a still culturally bounded and fallible way a Western democratic society with all its deficiencies over, for example, a totalitarian theocracy that is ruled by brutish religious zealots.

In the postmodern vein, we find that all languages—even that of the research psychologist—can enter the culture and be used by people to justify, separate, control, and castigate. In effect, for the psychologist there is no escaping matters of moral and political consequence.

Postmodernists criticize the somewhat authoritarian see also Feyerabend and Oberheim, modernist narrative of a cumulative growth of knowledge see above , but critical rationalists do so as well. It should also be noted that neither Lyotard nor Gergen rule out the possibility of some forms of progress, such as technological innovation e. However, to Gergen, the main contribution of psychology to society is not so much technology, for example, in the form of new and innovative ways of measuring psychological properties and approaches to the treatment of psychiatric diseases.

Instead, the main function of psychology, at least in a modern Western democracy, could be to explore different forms of seeing the world and of being in the world: psychology can bring into the open voices that are the most often marginalized within the mainstream societal discourse.

However, I do not think that a critical rationalist would object to this endeavor, as long as it does not lead to the cynical refusal to believe in the possibility of any form of consensus and progress. It is of course also understandable that a physicist such as Deutsch focuses in his epistemology first and foremost on what Gergen calls technological innovation and not so much on social and societal issues. One difference is that critical rationalists such as Popper or Deutsch emphasize more strongly that the resulting ideas from concepts such as generative theory or small-scale societal experiments have to be evaluated critically:.

This growth, this self-transcendence, has a rational side and a non-rational side. The creation of new ideas, of new theories, is partly non-rational. But intuition is fallible, as is everything human. Intuition must be controlled through rational criticism, which is the most important product of human language. This control through criticism is the rational aspect of the growth of knowledge and of our personal growth. It is one of the three most important things that make us human.

The other two are compassion, and the consciousness of our fallibility Popper, , p. Again, the two approaches may differ from each other more in terms of prioritization than in terms of substance.

To my understanding, postmodernists and critical rationalists have in common that they first and foremost argue against different forms of totalitarianism and that they both encourage the expression of deviating opinions and different voices.

However, critical rationalists seem to abhor primarily the specter of a cynical relativism that renders futile any attempts at mutual understanding and at facilitating a change for the better, postmodernists are more concerned about a dogmatic positivistic scientific culture that considers itself superior and to some degree infallible and that has a tendency to silence critics and alternative approaches.

It seems to be that both approaches share similar concerns, but their protagonists may have had personal experiences with different forms of dogmatism, which may have led to different sets of fears and concerns. Qualitative methods of inquiry may often be better suited to explore different constructions of reality and the effects of, for example, certain psychological theories or viewpoints on the emergence of corresponding life-worlds.

Overall, postmodernist researchers seem to be free in choosing any research method they like as long as they are aware that all scientific inquiries are in the end acts of communication within a culturally bound tradition and a system of meaning making.

Hence, no claims for an objective or absolute truth can be deduced from any research method. What research methods can do for the postmodernist is that they can aid her in understanding — from her culturally bounded position — the plurality of culturally embedded psychological realities and the ways in which such realities can change under certain conditions.

To the critical rationalist, the role and function of empirical research methods are to allow for criticism of theories in the form of giving them a chance to fail. Every scientific discipline will need a range of different methods to expose their respective theories to criticism. Hence, one can very well imagine that different research methods are more or less useful in different areas of the so-called natural and social sciences, which can be no more than loosely defined traditions to the critical rationalist.

What does this mean and what would be the implications for the social scientist? Popper himself certainly favored different kinds of research methods in the social sciences. From a postmodern perspective, this approach to social scientific research can be critziced, for example, because it may tend to ignore the socio-cultural boundedness of social practices and the constructedness of rationality itself.

Maybe a critical rationalist would respond that as long as such criticism is presented in a way that it yields debatable or empirically testable assumptions, it can perfectly well be reconciled with a critical rationalist approach to research. He also suggests trying to build bridges to more humanities-based approaches in sociology. Taken together, postmodernists as well as critical rationalists take a pragmatic stance when it comes to research methods.

Postmodernists tend to prefer research methods that allow for the reconstruction of different forms of discourse, whereas most critical rationalists may value approaches that allow for increasingly objective arguments away from intersubjectivity. Still, there do not seem to be any irreconcilable differences here. It is fairly easy to find a common enemy of postmodernists and critical rationalists: modernist psychologists who insist that only experiments or other research methods that are supposedly borrowed from the hard natural sciences guarantee true knowledge.

By insisting this, they immunize their theories against criticism since any objection that does not result from experiments can be easily devalued as being unscientific. Thus, modernist psychologists unfairly make their worldview privileged, excluding other voices from the perspective of the postmodernists. Such approaches can easily be misused as propaganda tools in socio-political power struggles. Both postmodernists and critical rationalists would ask scientists to be bold, to try out new ways, and to bring diverging opinions to the front.

Science is not about being timid and hiding behind pompous technical language Billig, or haughty and complicated research methods. Science is — or should be — an adventure cf.

Willig, , and scientists should have the audacity to ask questions that have never been asked before and to try out new solutions to old problems. No knowledge, no theory, and no empirical research is sacrosanct; everything can and must be questioned at any time. I do not see much of a difference between both approaches here.

Both approaches also encourage social scientists to think of themselves as parts of the world and not as passive and objective observers. Serious practical problems, such as the problems of poverty, of illiteracy, of political suppression or of uncertainty concerning legal rights were important starting points for research in the social sciences. Yet these practical problems led to speculation, to theorizing and thus to theoretical problems. The solving of societal problems can probably only be a byproduct of social scientific research.

Gergen goes to great length in his texts to avoid any notion of this kind of progress: all knowledge that might result from any scientific activity can only be understood within its own cultural tradition and cannot claim superiority over other forms of knowledge that resulted from other cultural traditions. In the following statement, for example, Gergen is discussing the merits of the newly emerging field of theoretical psychology:. The point of criticism should not be that of terminating traditions or practices but of helping them to evolve in ways that more fully integrate the voices of the discipline and of its constituents and contribute to the intellectual resources of the world Gergen, , p.

To me, it is difficult to think of a successful contribution to the intellectual resources of the world without employing some concept of better and worse contributions. However, Gergen would probably maintain that this concept itself is culturally and temporally bounded.

On the other hand, critical rationalists such as Popper and Deutsch will have to justify their optimism in believing that striving for truth and objectivity will finally lead to primarily positive consequences. At the same time, critical rationalists have to be aware of the dangers that even well-meaning attempts to contribute to the creation of a better world can turn out to be disastrous and that attempts at reaching a mutual understanding among different voices can unwillingly lead to the establishment of cultural hegemony.

In the end, there are many commonalities between critical rationalist and postmodern approaches: a dislike for modernist arrogance, an emphasis on boldness and innovation, and a struggle against totalitarian attempts to oppress voices in a discourse. Both approaches value attempts by social scientists to address real world problems and to challenge dogmas and established world views. The differences between critical rationalists and postmodernists boil down to differences in preferences and predilections: whereas postmodernists sometimes challenge arrogant modernist conceptualizations in a cynical way, critical rationalists prefer to propagate optimism with regard to the question as to whether there are at least some problems that we, as scientists, may be able to solve in a tentative and preliminary way.

Whereas postmodernists are mostly afraid of dogmatic empiricists that hide their own political agenda behind claims for objective truth, critical rationalists are first and foremost weary of zealous postmodernists who themselves hide their political agenda behind their own claims of objectivity. Whereas postmodernists value a plurality of different voices, critical rationalists hope for a consensual resolution of conflicts by means of relying of increasingly objective arguments.

On a personal note, I do not think that any of these differences are beyond reconciliation. Both approaches value open and free discussions above everything else, and this fact alone should provide common ground for attempts at increasing mutual understanding.

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication. The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Allport, F. Social psychology. Boston: Houghton. Google Scholar. Anthony, A. Asch, S. Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority.

Billig, M. The city of Las Vegas became the ultimate expression of postmodern architecture. Theorists associated with postmodernism often used the term to mark a new cultural epoch in the West.

In his essay Postmodernism and Consumer Society , Jameson set out the major tropes of postmodern culture. These included, to paraphrase: the substitution of pastiche for the satirical impulse of parody; a predilection for nostalgia; and a fixation on the perpetual present. In the visual arts, postmodernism is associated with a group of New York artists — including Sherrie Levine , Richard Prince and Cindy Sherman — who were engaged in acts of image appropriation, and have since become known as The Pictures Generation after a show curated by Douglas Crimp.

But the origins of these strategies lay with Dada artist Marcel Duchamp , and the Pop artists of the s in whose work culture had become a raw material. After all, Andy Warhol was the direct progenitor of the kitsch consumerist art of Jeff Koons in the s.

Postmodernism can also be a critical project, revealing the cultural constructions we designate as truth and opening up a variety of repressed other histories of modernity.

Such as those of women, homosexuals and the colonised. The modernist canon itself is revealed as patriarchal and racist, dominated by white heterosexual men.