Why russia support syria

Moscow has also failed to leverage its position in the Syrian conflict to jump-start dialogue with the West on sanctions or even get Western Europe to commit to funding the reconstruction of war-ravaged Syria. At the same time, Russia is not in full control of Damascus. The regime is quite independent and is able to use both Moscow and Tehran to ensure its survival. In addition, the continued Turkish and American military presence in resource-rich northern Syria also guarantees Ankara and Washington a say in the future of Syria.

Russia entered the Syrian war amid an economic crisis due to slumping oil prices and the fallout of the Ukrainian crisis. This initially caused domestic concern about the cost of the war. At the same time, the Russian government has presented the operation in Syria as an opportunity to test and promote Russian weaponry something other large arms exporters, like the US and Israel, have also done in the region.

In , the defence ministry said some new weapons had been tested in military action in Syria. In recent years, there have been reports of Wagner mercenaries being employed in Venezuela, Mozambique, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Libya and elsewhere. Prigozhin, along with another Russian businessman considered close to the Kremlin, Gennady Timchenko, has won some lucrative contracts in Syria. The European Union and the US are major trade partners of Russia and both have imposed heavy sanctions on Syria, which Russian businesses would rather avoid.

This has also complicated the reconstruction process in areas badly damaged by fighting where the Syrian government has regained control. Russia itself has not committed any significant funding for reconstruction and has failed to convince the EU or Gulf countries to do so. The financial lifeline, which Tehran was able to extend since the beginning of the war, has also dried up due to US sanctions on the Iranian economy. While economic opportunities have not been that significant for the Russian economy, the political leverage that Russia acquired with its intervention in Syria opened the door to increased economic cooperation with other countries in the region.

Russian companies have also acquired lucrative energy contracts in Egypt, Lebanon, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Turkey. Apart from concerns about the financial cost, there was no major domestic opposition to the intervention at its outset.

Subsequent reports of the use of chemical weapons by Syrian government forces, the targeting of hospitals by the Russian air force and a high death toll among civilians have not swayed public opinion. Its foreign adventures seemed to have paid off.

Although the path to political settlement and post-conflict reconstruction will be bumpy, there is a confidence that the Astana framework will eventually produce the acceptable outcome.

Thus, the Kremlin sensed the need to start decreasing its regional presence while openly embracing its original for-profit interests increased trade and regional political capital that should be clear to all parties within the region.

Now, with Washington voluntary removing itself from the Syrian equation, Moscow remains vigilant about the possible resurgence of violent nonstate actors such as the Islamic State or al-Nusra, but it also envisions transforming its bullheaded strategy into a more opportunistic one.

Once again, the Kremlin is striving to assert itself as a powerbroker. Moscow wants the nations of the region to treat it as a power capable of leveraging opportunities—whether in the field of energy, arms exports, or agriculture—as well as preserving a favorable security balance. Moscow could soon find itself in the midst of a scorching conflict with sectarian shades, and Putin would have no choice but to take sides , effectively undermining the intermediary role.

Moscow at that time was also preoccupied with geopolitical games, fighting Islamist fundamentalists in Afghanistan, but the state of domestic affairs was in disarray—and we all know how it ended. Dmitriy Frolovskiy is a political analyst and independent journalist. He also works as a consultant on policy and strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia. Before their Helsinki summit, the U. A tougher stance from the United Nations would put pressure on Assad and Putin while improving the lives of ordinary Syrians.

Shusha was the key to the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Now Baku wants to turn the fabled fortress town into a resort. Argument An expert's point of view on a current event. By Dmitriy Frolovskiy.

What drives Russian leaders' decisionmaking on intervention? The decision to intervene in Syria in resulted from an extraordinary confluence of political drivers and military-enabling factors. Three political factors emerge as primary drivers of the decision: the perception that an adverse military outcome—the collapse of the Assad regime—was imminent and that it could be prevented by intervening; the belief that this outcome would have had grave security implications; and the view that alternative means e.

Several enabling military factors specific to Syria constituted necessary preconditions for the intervention: air access to the theater, permission to use ports and airbases, and the presence of allies on the ground. Intervention short of the direct, overt use of the military seen in Syria in , but greater than mere diplomacy, requires that the conflict in question present a high level of threat as in Afghanistan , promise significant geopolitical benefits as in Libya , or demonstrate moderate levels of both as in Syria pre Russia is unlikely to intervene on a scale comparable to the action in Syria in any of the other three countries examined in the report—Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

The drivers for such an action are currently absent. However, should the drivers that were present in Syria emerge, Russia is likely to increase its involvement. The threshold for interventions of a smaller scale could plausibly be met in a variety of country settings, which suggests that there are likely to be more of these in the future.

The U. Planners should always be cognizant of Russian interests in each country in the region and expect competition both for basing and for influence in those states where Moscow has made diplomatic and political-military inroads.