Who said splendid isolation

Peace was secure on the Continent as long as the Continent was divided into two armed camps of equal strength, and England had no reason to fear continental aggression as long as the two antagonistic combinations were absorbed in watching one another.

Up to British relations with the Powers of the Dual Alliance were very unsatisfactory. With France herself and Russia the British relations were difficult. With the first, war was more than once imminent; with the second it actually took place. Both affairs arose out of the "Eastern Question.

But, as a matter of fact, it had fallen to Great Britain to take the place which her commercial and political interests would not allow to be taken by either Russia or France. She had conquered the Mediterranean at the battle of the Nile; and every day made it more apparent to statesmen that India could not be retained if a hostile Power occupied the Levant.

Each year also the enormous responsibility which the possession of India involved was brought more and more home to the British nation by dangerous wars and insurrections. Since the year Britian had adopted what is styled a Two-Power standard, initially based upon the strength of the French Fleet alone. It became the ideal in this country to lay down two battleships for every one which was commenced in a French shipbuilding yard. Owing to political exigencies, this formula was not observed, and during the late s, though the strength of the Fleet was undoubtedly increased.

And from to Britain had a Two-Power standard based on the strength of the French and Russian Fleets, with a margin over of 10 percent, to provide for contingencies in view of the growing power of the German Fleet. Russia, following her traditional policy in Asia, advanced with sap and mine sometimes from the one side, sometimes from the other, upon the British position in India.

Every few years a threatened Russian advance upon India threw the City into a panic. Britain was in a latent state of war with Russia. Russia, reckoning on the continuance of the British policy of non-interference, repudiated the Treaty of Paris by which the Crimean War had been concluded; but her invasion of Turkey in , which ensued upon that repudiation, was rendered harmless, and even beneficial, by the interposition at the critical moment of Lord Beaconsfield, who did not hesitate to summon troops from India to support the fleet which he had sent to the Bosphorus.

British relations with France were not much better. Largely owing to the skilful policy of Germany, there was constant friction between France and England in Siam, Egypt, West Africa and Newfoundland, and once or twice Britain was on the brink of war with that France.

The naval forces of France were concentrated in Toulon and Bizerta, and threatened demonstratively Malta and Britain's route to the East via the Suez Canal. The largest British fleet had to be kept in the Mediterranean in constant readiness for war. Under these circumstances it was only natural that the sympathies of Great Britain went towards the Triple Alliance. An Anglo-Russian or an Anglo-French war, which would have weakened the Dual Alliance, was evidently advantageous to the three central-European Powers, especially to the leading one, the more so if it was long drawn out and exhaustive to both combatants.

Why, then, should they exert themselves in England's favor? Splendid isolation is the term used at the time for the 19th-century British diplomatic practice of avoiding permanent alliances, particularly under the governments of Lord Salisbury between and The practice emerged as early as with Britain's exit from the post Concert of Europe and continued until the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Then, with the Entente Cordiale with France, Europe was divided into two power blocs and Britain's isolation during the — Second Boer War led to a final reversal of the policy.

The term was coined in January by a Canadian politician, George Eulas Foster, indicating his approval for Britain's minimal involvement in European affairs by saying, "In these somewhat troublesome days when the great Mother Empire stands splendidly isolated in Europe. The numerical value of splendid isolation in Chaldean Numerology is: 2. The numerical value of splendid isolation in Pythagorean Numerology is: 8. We're doing our best to make sure our content is useful, accurate and safe.

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How to pronounce splendid isolation? Alex US English. David US English. At the same time, the logic of isolationism was undermined by at least two factors. Other countries, such as Austria, France and Russia, were increasing their steel production at a faster pace than Britain. Although this development took some time to affect contemporary perception of reality, British officials could not but be aware of the statistics which questioned the claim that Britain was the greatest nation on earth.

Above all, Britain emerged from isolation because other powers were increasingly threatening its naval and imperial role. Lee emphasises that Germany was the most serious danger, for it was becoming a powerful and expansionist country, pursuing a policy of.

France, for its part, was building up its naval capacity and Russia, which had constructed a major base at Port Arthur, was threatening to control the access to many north China ports. Such an alliance could help defend the Empire, reduce defence costs, deter other countries from attacking Britain and improve the chances of winning a war if one broke out. The first country to be approached was Germany: in an attempt to resolve colonial disputes, an Anglo-German agreement was signed in , followed by the Anglo-German China agreement of Entente of The hope behind the Entente was that a less unfriendly France might help to restrain Russian ambitions.

Again, the objective was to eliminate imperial rivalries. However, experts suggest that while Britain was seeking to solve imperial issues through diplomacy, it also unintentionally fostered new links, which meant that isolation was no longer an option.

The most important factor that drew Britain further into Europe was probably the German threat. It still had not signed a treaty involving a clear military commitment, however.

The assassination at Sarajevo on 28th June came as a major blow for the European continent, and the prospect of open conflict started to loom large. Sir Edward Grey , the British Foreign Secretary, assumed that the crisis could be contained through negotiations; when Germany refused to negotiate, Grey tried to persuade his Cabinet to stand by France if the latter was attacked by Germany, but most of his ministers were opposed to the idea. Yet the Cabinet decided to treat any violation of Belgian neutrality as a.

As Stephen J. And it was only by mobilising their imperial resources that Britain and France, helped by the Americans, emerged victorious. The Treaty of Versailles, which put an end to the war, proved dangerously humiliating for Germany: it lost large parts of its territory and had to pledge huge sums in reparations; it also suffered the indignity of numerous restrictions on its national sovereignty. These conditions would ultimately lead to World War II.

As Alex May points out, now that the war accelerated the evolution of the self-governing dominions Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa into semi-independent states, Britain felt the need to maintain the unity of the Empire. During the inter-war period, Britain distanced itself from all major developments in Europe. Successive governments launched initiatives aiming to obtain a peaceful revision of the Treaty, but to no avail. After Hitler had invaded Czechoslovakia in March , Britain and France made last-minute commitments to the other central and eastern European states.

This did not prevent Hitler from invading Poland on 1st September Two days later, Britain was at war. At the beginning, pro-federalist ideas and activities progressed remarkably in Britain. The idea took the shape of an Anglo-French union and a declaration of economic and political union was drafted. And when de Gaulle a mere Under-Secretary in the War Department at the time declared his intention to continue the war and several governments in exile in London advocated a federal union, the British showed themselves less and less interested in a European federation.

Building a close relationship with France after the war proved complicated because France and Britain had different objectives and de Gaulle was not easy to deal with. As a result, Britain stood aloof from European development and did not join the six countries which in signed the Treaty of Rome and formed the EEC. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that Britain regarded itself first and foremost as a commercial power turned to the world rather than Europe and saw its future in preserving strong links with the Empire and Commonwealth, which proved another significant brake on integration with Europe.

Georges Pompidou was then President of France, and while being a Gaullist, proved more open to British membership, seeing Britain as a potential counterweight to Germany, now the economic giant of the European Community.

Her uncompromising style inevitably expressed itself in European as well as in domestic policy. She was also a convinced Atlanticist, and this position was strengthened after by her personal bond with Ronald Reagan. She saw the EEC as a zone of prosperity and freedom compatible with Atlanticism.

She considered Europe to be an essential bulwark against the Soviet menace and. In economic terms, she hoped that the free market aspects of the Community would intensify.