Who invented legalism

Goldin 14— In this regard their views of historical evolution and of human nature are highly engaging. The Warring States period was an age of comprehensive sociopolitical change, and thinkers of different intellectual affiliations had to come to terms with this change.

Legalists were much more resolute in their willingness to dispense with traditional modes of rule, and they questioned the very relevance of the past to the present. Their attack on supporters of learning from the past was twofold.

First, there was simply no uniform model of orderly rule in the past to be emulated. Second, and more substantially, society evolves, and this evolution turns behavioral modes, institutions, and even values of the past obsolete. The first and best-known argument in favor of dispensing with the past models is presented in the first chapter of the Book of Lord Shang. Han Fei explains further: past models are irrelevant not only because they were changing from time to time, but also because we cannot verify exactly what they were.

Yet having postulated the impossibility of learning from past models, Shang Yang and Han Fei propose an alternative lesson that can be learnt: that changing circumstances may require not a piecemeal but a comprehensive readjustment of the sociopolitical system. To demonstrate the magnitude of change in the past, both thinkers turn to remotest antiquity, and trace how the state was formed. For instance, Shang Yang depicts social evolution from primeval promiscuous life to an incipient stratified society and then to a fully mature state with laws, regulations, officials, and the power of coercion Shang jun shu 7: 51—53; Book of Lord Shang 7.

Now, this age of primeval morality has gone forever. Both thinkers emphasize the devastating impact of demographic growth on human mores. Under these new circumstances, moral norms are no longer relevant; contention is the rule, and it can be quelled only through coercion. The evolutionary view of history and especially the emphasis that economic conditions can alter moral values, distinguish the Legalists critically from proponents of alternative models of state formation Pines a.

The Legalists imply that everything is changeable: as socioeconomic conditions change, human behavior changes as well; and this in turn requires adaptation of political institutions. Shang Yang summarizes:. When the affairs of the world change, one should implement a different Way. If radical restructuring of society was legitimate in the past, so it is in the present.

The Book of Lord Shang but not Han Feizi allowed for the possibility that in the future the need for excessive reliance on coercion would end and a milder, morality-driven political structure would evolve, but these utopian digressions are of minor importance in the text Pines a.

What matters is the bottom line: radical reforms were inevitable in the past; and they are inevitable in the present. The second pillar of Legalist political philosophy is their view of human nature. Legalists eschew the discussion of whether or not human badness or goodness are inborn, or whether or not all humans possess fundamentally similar qualities.

Shang Yang explains how to attain this:. Yet they brave what they consider bitter and perform what they consider dangerous because of the calculation [of a name and benefit]. The entire sociopolitical system advocated by Shang Yang can be seen as the realization of this recommendation Pines b. Yet in marked distinction from Xunzi and from other Confucian thinkers, the Legalists dismissed the possibility that the elite—rulers and ministers alike—would be able to overcome their selfishness.

For the Legalists, it was equally axiomatic that this cannot be the case. Shen Dao explains:. Among the people, everybody acts for himself. If you [try to] alter them and cause them to act for you, then there will be none whom you can attain and employ.

Employ the people for their own [interests], do not employ them for your sake: then there will be none whom you cannot make use of Shenzi, 24—25; Harris Shen Dao dismisses the possibility that the ministers will be driven by moral commitment; on the contrary, such exceptional individuals should not be employed at all.

This sentiment recurs in Han Feizi , a text that expresses with utmost clarity its belief that every member of the elite—like any member of society—pursues his own interests cf. Goldin 58—65; Proper administrative system should not be based on trust and respect for ministers; rather they should be tightly controlled.

A political system that presupposes human selfishness is the only viable political system. Elsewhere, the text specifies:. In the past, those who were able to regulate All-under-Heaven first had to regulate their own people; those who were able to overcome the enemy had first to overcome their own people. The root of overcoming the people is controlling the people as the metalworker controls metal and the potter clay.

When the roots are not firm, the people will be like flying birds and running animals: Who will then be able to regulate them? The root of the people is law. Hence, those who excel at orderly rule block the people with law; then a [good] name and lands can be attained.

Shang jun shu ; Book of Lord Shang Moreover, to overawe the people, the text advocates inflicting heavy punishments for even petty offenses, as only then will the people be sufficiently scared as to behave properly. Eventually, harsh punishments will eliminate the very need for punishments:. To prevent wrongdoing and stop transgressions, nothing is better than making punishments heavy.

When punishments are heavy and [criminals] are inevitably captured, then the people dare not try [to break the law]. Hence, there are no penalized people in the state. Due to above pronouncements, Shang Yang gained notoriety as an advocate of oppression; but actually his attitude toward the people is much more balanced than is often imagined. The people are not just the potential enemy of the ruler: they are his major asset.

Without their hard labor in the fields or their bravery on the battlefield, the state is doomed. Yet the people will not embrace tilling and waging war just out of fear of coercion.

A more complex system is needed: one that will introduce attractive positive incentives along with awe-inspiring negative ones. Shang Yang explains:. Human beings have likes and dislikes; hence, the people can be ruled. The ruler must investigate likes and dislikes. Likes and dislikes are the root of rewards and penalties. The disposition of the people is to like ranks and emoluments and to dislike punishments and penalties. Shang jun shu 9: 65; Book of Lord Shang 9. This system became the cornerstone of social life in Qin.

The lowest ranks were distributed for military achievements, particularly decapitating enemy soldiers, or could be purchased in exchange for extra grain yields; successful rank-holders could be incorporated into the military or civilian administration and thereafter be promoted up the social ladder.

Each rank granted its holder economic, social, and legal privileges; and since the ranks were not fully inheritable, the system generated considerable social mobility see details in Loewe and ; Pines et al. This latter concern is strongly pronounced throughout the Book of Lord Shang :. The means whereby the sovereign encourages the people are offices and ranks; the means by which the state prospers are agriculture and warfare.

Today the people seek offices and ranks, yet they are attainable not through agriculture and warfare but through crafty words and empty ways: this is called to exhaust the people.

Shang jun shu 3: 20; Book of Lord Shang 3. The text insists repeatedly that the only way to make agriculture and warfare attractive is to prevent any alternative route toward enrichment and empowerment. Any group which tries to bypass engagement in agriculture and warfare—be these merchants who amass riches without tilling or talkative intellectuals who seek promotion without contributing to the state economically or militarily—should be suppressed or at least squeezed out of profits. Nothing—neither learning, nor commerce, nor even artisanship—should distract the people from farming and making war.

The text summarizes:. Hence, my teaching causes those among the people who seek benefits to gain them nowhere else but in tilling and those who want to avoid harm to escape nowhere but to war. Within the borders, everyone among the people first devotes himself to tilling and warfare and only then obtains whatever pleases him. Hence, though the territory is small, grain is plenty, and though the people are few, the army is powerful. He who is able to implement these two within the borders will accomplish the way of Hegemon and Monarch.

To rule and control the people effectively, the government should rely on an extensive bureaucracy; but this bureaucracy in turn should be properly staffed and tightly monitored.

Their strongly pronounced suspicion of scheming ministers and selfish officials was conducive to the promulgation of impersonal means of recruitment, promotion, demotion, and performance control. One of the primary issues that the rulers of the Warring States faced was that of recruitment into government service.

During the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period, the overwhelming majority of officials were scions of hereditary ministerial lineages; only exceptionally could outsiders join the government. This widespread practice was deeply resented by the Legalists. When you hear his words, you consider him able; when you ask his partisans, they approve it.

Hence, one is ennobled before one has any merits; one is punished before one has committed a crime. Shang jun shu —; Book of Lord Shang Shen Dao further warns the ruler that if he decides on promotions and demotions on the basis of his personal impression, this will cause inflated expectations or excessive resentment among his servants:. If this is the case, then even if rewards are appropriate, the expectations are insatiable; even if the punishments are appropriate, lenience is sought ceaselessly.

If the ruler abandons the standard and relies on his heart to decide upon the degree [of awards and punishments], then identical merits will be rewarded differently, and identical crimes will be punished differently. It is from this that resentment arises. Shenzi , 52; Harris An alternative will be a set of clear impersonal rules that will regulate recruitment and promotion of officials.

For Shang Yang, recruitment will be based on the ranks of merit. Han Fei remains doubtful about these: after all, why should valiant soldiers who gained ranks of merit become good officials? Han Fei himself does not solve the problem of initial recruitment but develops ways to monitor subsequent promotion of an official:. Thus, as for the officials of an enlightened ruler: chief ministers and chancellors must rise from among local officials; valiant generals must rise from among the ranks.

One who has merit should be awarded: then ranks and emoluments are bountiful and they are ever more encouraging; one who is promoted and ascends to higher positions, his official responsibilities increase, and he performs his tasks ever more orderly. When ranks and emoluments are great, while official responsibilities are dealt with in an orderly way—this is the Way of the Monarch.

Han Feizi This objective process of promotion according to measurable and objective merits became one of the hallmarks of the Chinese administrative system throughout the imperial era and beyond.

Rewards and punishments primarily promotion and demotion are the major handles through which the ruler has to control his officials. But how to judge their performance?

Performance and title refers to statements and tasks. The minister presents his statement; the ruler assigns him tasks according to his statement, and evaluates his merits exclusively according to the task. When the merit is in accordance with the task, and the task is in accordance with the statement, then [the minister] is awarded; when the merit is not in accordance with the task, and the task is not in accordance with the statement, then he is punished.

Han Feizi 7: 40— This latter point is of particular importance to the Legalists. Both terms are similar to fa but are narrower in their meaning, referring primarily to a variety of means through which the ruler controls his officials. This is what the ruler should hold.

Yet amid the strong emphasis on the power of techniques, rules, laws, and regulations, we can discover the sober realization that even these are not always enough, and that a perfect administrative system simply cannot come into existence. Thus, in one of the later chapters of the Book of Lord Shang it is said:. Nowadays, [the ruler] relies on many officials and numerous clerks; to monitor them he establishes assistants and supervisors.

Assistants are installed and supervisors are established to prohibit [officials] from pursuing [personal] profit; yet assistants and supervisors also seek profit, so how they will able to prohibit each other? Insofar as techniques and rules are implemented by self-interested—or simply erring—human beings, the question remains: to what extent can the impersonal mode of rule cure the intrinsic maladies of the bureaucratic system cf.

Van Norden ? This evaluation should be qualified, though. Rather, their distinctiveness was in their pronounced anti-ministerial stance.

This stance is exemplified by the following saying of Shen Buhai:. Now the reason why a ruler builds lofty inner walls and outer walls, looks carefully to the barring of doors and gates, is [to prepare against] the coming of invaders and bandits. But one who murders the ruler and takes his state does not necessarily climb over difficult walls and batter in barred doors and gates.

Creel , translation modified. This warning epitomizes what may be considered the major dividing line between Legalists and their opponents. Despite their pronounced belief in monarchic form of rule, most thinkers of the Warring States period insisted that the monarch would never succeed without a worthy aide. Their common desideratum was attaining harmonious relations between the ministers and the rulers; not coincidentally, the common simile of these relations was that of friends, i.

One of the most radical manifestations of this pro-ministerial mindset of the Warring States era was the idea of abdication, according to which a good ruler may consider yielding the throne to his meritorious aide Allan ; Pines For Legalists, in contrast, this very idea proved that the pro-ministerial discourse of their rivals was usurpation in disguise.

They added a few new dimensions to this overarching monarchistic discourse. Goldin 3—4. As such, his power is conceived not as the means of personal enjoyment but as the common interest of his subjects. Shen Dao elaborates:. In antiquity, the Son of Heaven was established and esteemed not in order to benefit the single person. Hence the Son of Heaven is established for the sake of All under Heaven, it is not that All under Heaven is established for the sake of the Son of Heaven….

Even if the law is bad, it is better than absence of laws; thereby the hearts of the people are unified. Shenzi , 16; Harris Shen Dao presents his political credo with rare clarity. A ruler is crucial for the proper functioning of the political system; he is the real foundation of political order, not a beneficiary but rather a servant of humankind.

Significantly, the ruler attains these blessed results by the sheer fact of his existence and not due to his morality or intelligence. As Shen Dao clearly states, bad laws are better than a lawless situation, and we may infer that a bad ruler is better than anarchy. As long as the ruler preserves his power intact, i. Otherwise, turmoil is inevitable. Shen Dao warns:. When the Son of Heaven is established, he should not let the regional lords doubt [his position]; when a lord is established, he should not let nobles doubt [his position]; … Doubts bring commotion; doubleness [of the sources of authority] brings contention, intermingling brings mutual injury; harm is from sharing, not from singularity Shenzi , 47—48; Harris It is because by the sheer fact of his exclusive authority, the ruler is able to arbitrate conflicts among his ministers and to preserve the chain of command in his state, without which the state may collapse.

The very fact that the monarch—unlike his officials—owed his position to pedigree alone meant that this position would more often than not be occupied by a mediocrity. The intrinsic contradiction between an institutionally infallible and humanly erring sovereign is the major source of tension in the Han Feizi Pines b. Thinkers of different ideological inclinations shared the sober realization that a sovereign may be a mediocrity; yet for them this problem was easily resolvable.

Insofar as the ruler would be prudent enough to entrust everyday affairs to a meritorious aide, he would be able to continue enjoying absolute prestige, while practical matters would be decided by worthy ministers see, e. For Han Fei, though, this solution is unacceptable. Every single person around the throne should be suspected; and minimal negligence can cost a ruler his life and his power.

Han Fei compares them to hungry tigers ready to devour the sovereign whenever the opportunity arrives:. If the minister does not murder his ruler, it is because the cliques and cabals are not formed.

Han Feizi 8: This is an amazing saying: the minister is, by his nature, deceitful and murderous, and his failure to eliminate the sovereign is simply a sign of insufficient preparations, not of unwillingness to do so.

But going beyond this personal tragedy there is a more general question: how can the ruler maintain his functions in the situation of permanent danger and absolute mistrust between him and his aides?

But this supposedly neat solution is problematic. Second, it remains unclear how the ruler will gain access to reliable information if each of his close aides—as Han Fei reminds him—is a potential cheater Han Feizi 6: 36— The monarch is the most revered individual, but also the weakest chain in the government apparatus. He can be duped by his underlings, is prone to misjudge them, and his actions may frequently endanger the very foundations of political order that he is supposed to safeguard.

Hence, the thinker repeatedly urges the ruler to refrain from any personal activities, any reliance on personal knowledge, and any manifestation of personal likes and dislikes. The thinker summarizes his recommendations:. The ruler does not reveal his desires; should he do so, the minister will carve and embellish them.

He does not reveal his views; should he do so, the minister will use them to present his different [opinion]. When there is success, the ruler possesses a worthy [name]; when there is failure, the minister bears the responsibility. Han Feizi 5: This is a curious recommendation: the ruler should completely nullify himself both in order to preserve his authority against scheming ministers, and to acquire—unjustly! Yet this sovereign, who has neither desires nor observable views, becomes the ultimate slave of his office.

For the sake of self-preservation he must abolish his personality, being completely submerged by the system which he ostensibly runs. This paradox of an entrapped sovereign, who enjoys God-like omnipotence, but who is required to refrain from any activism in order to preserve this omnipotence is one of the most fascinating manifestations of the intrinsic contradiction of the authoritarian system.

When it comes from a thinker who is often described as singularly authoritarian-minded, it deserves utmost attention. Some of the aspects of the Legalist program—a powerful state that overwhelms society, rigid control over the populace and the administrative apparatus, harsh laws, and the like—seem to lend support to this equation.

Yet when we move to the realm of thought control—a sine qua non for a true totalitarian polity—the results are somewhat equivocal.

Shang Yang is particularly notorious for his comprehensive assault on traditional culture and on moral values. What's the connection of Legalism to other ancient Chinese philosophies? Who was the most powerful believer of Legalism in ancient China? Main ideas of Legalism. Legalism is an ancient Chinese philosophical school regarding the law, reform, governance, management, economic regulation, etc.

It valued equality, reform, the efficiency of enforcement of the law, and opposed hierarchy and aristocracy. The ideology of Legalism included a complete and practical system, in which people would equally get rewarded for following the law or making contributions, and get punished for breaking the law, no matter which class one comes from.

Legalism ideals originated about 3, to 4, years ago, from judicial officials of the Xia and Shang Dynasty in the history of China. Meanwhile, their thoughts were presented in their articles or other documentation, which made sure this philosophical school was well preserved and inherited in Chinese culture.

Han Fei contributed the most essential theories in Legalism; a series of his articles included and developed ideas and means of implementing this philosophy in a country. Meanwhile, Han Fei, as well as some other Legalism ideologists, claimed that the essence of their essays followed the ideas of Taoism. Li Si, the prime minister of the Qin Dynasty BC — BC , made a great contribution to the unification of characters, measurements, currency, and implementation of the System of Prefectures and Counties, etc.

Under the suggestion of prime minister Li Si, Emperor Qin Shi Huang respected Legalism as the only dominant philosophy of the Qin Empire, and his most trusted ministers were excellent masters of Legalism. Intellectuals were only allowed to learn Legalism ideology that was strictly implemented nationwide.

This was the most prosperous era for the Legalism ideology in the history of China. After Qin Shi Huang departed and his empire was overthrown, Legalism was widely considered to be over cruel and strict, especially in a stable and unified empire. Since then, Legalism has been no longer dominant in the history of China, except in some turbulent and chaotic eras.

In unified and stable dynasties, however, Legalism was always applied as an auxiliary ideology combined with Confucianism by emperors in the next millenniums. Implement of reward and punishment should be based on people's behaviors, not social or political status. The only exception is the monarch. Therefore, explicit awards and penalties could guide people to do the right things. Movements among social classes are allowable.

The ancient hierarchy and aristocratic hereditary should be abolished.